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Abstract Concepts from cultural attractor theory are now used in domains far from
their original home in anthropology and cultural evolution. Yet these concepts have
not been consistently characterised. I here distinguish four ways in which the cul-
tural attractor concept has been used and identify three kinds of factors of attraction
typically appealed to. Clarifying these explanatory concepts identifies problems and
ambiguities in the work of cultural epidemiologists and commentators alike.
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Introduction
Cultural attractor theory (hereafter; CAT) is one of several approaches within
cultural evolutionary theory with the aim of explaining how ideational variants
change in their distribution and form over time (more on this below). Within
cultural evolutionary theory, CAT is distinguished by its transformative approach,
holding that the content of variants are transformed during the acquisition process
(Sperber 1985, 1996).
The central explanatory concept of CAT is that of cultural attractors. Cultural
attractors are theoretical posits that capture the way in which certain ideational
variants are more likely to be the outcome of transformations than others. Insofar as
these transformations are systematic across members of a population, CAT can be
used to explain changes in the distribution and form of ideational variants in a
population over time. It is in this way that CAT has been used in anthropology to
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explain the ubiquity and diversity in cross-cultural beliefs in the supernatural (Boyer
2001), in psychology to explain why some sentences and stories are better
remembered than others (Heath et al. 2001; Norenzayan et al. 2006; Mesoudi and
Whiten 2008), in linguistics to explain the evolution of grammatical structures
(Scott-Philips 2014), and in cultural evolution to provide distribution explanations
(Claidie`re and Sperber 2007).
The aim of this paper is not to evaluate the empirical merits of CAT. Instead, I
here aim at describing and clarifying the concepts it employs. Of course the
empirical merits of a theory go hand-in-hand with its conceptual tools. Yet in
elucidating and clarifying the nature of these tools, I here take much of what CAT
researchers (hereafter; ‘cultural epidemiologists’)1 have to say about the empirical
payoffs of their approach at face value.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I introduce a distinction
between transformative and preservative approaches to studying cultural evolution.
What is important about this distinction is not, or not just, a difference between the
fidelity of the underlying processes themselves—but the way in which change in the
underlying content of vehicles is brought about. While transformative approaches
take it that change involves the (re-)constructing activities of systems, preservative
approaches take it that change involves error or noise in a copying process. On the
back of this distinction, I show why it is wrong to identify CAT’s transformative
approach with concepts drawn from preservative approaches.
However, much of the action takes place in the middle sections where I analyse
cultural attractors and factors of attraction. As I show, there are four distinct
conceptualisations of the cultural attractor concept, with such cultural attractors
(however conceptualised) being the result of a number of distinct kinds of
underlying causes—or factors of attraction. I argue that by isolating these distinct
notions of cultural attractors and highlighting the various kinds of factors of
attraction, we are afforded a greater conceptual grip on the central commitments of
CAT.
Preservative and transformative approaches
The study of cultural evolution has multiple aims. One important aim is to describe
and explain the means by which ideational variants (things like norms, beliefs,
skills, and the like) and their behavioural expressions (artefacts, institutions, social
arrangements and the like) are acquired and distributed through populations. The
use of the term ‘ideational’ is meant to focus attention on the mental or cognitive—
and as I use the term, ‘ideational variants’ pick out mental representations whose
contents are expressed in behaviour (Sperber 1996; Mesoudi 2011). In a rough and
1 While there seems to be a coalescing around the label of ‘cultural attractor theory’, or ‘cultural
attraction theory’, to group together the work of individuals such a Dan Sperber, Nicolas Claidie`re,
Olivier Morin, and others, researchers in the field still refer to their approach as ‘cultural epidemiology’,
or the ‘epidemiological approach to culture’, and identify themselves as ‘cultural epidemiologists’
(Sperber 1985, 1996). While I prefer CAT as a label for picking out the theoretical commitments of this
group of researchers, I will use ‘cultural epidemiologists’ to identify the researchers themselves.
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ready way, one can understand the contents of these representations as ‘recipes for
action’.
Important for later discussion is a notion of similarity between ideational
variants. When I speak about the similarity between variants I have in mind
something like the following: when individuals have similar representational
contents (similar ideational variants) this similarity leads to the expression of similar
behaviours. Of course, the notion of ‘similarity’ is fraught, and filling in precisely
what is meant by ‘similar content’ or ‘similar behaviour’ and how the two are to be
mapped on to one another will be complex manner (Charbonneau 2015), but for
current purposes this intuitive characterisation will suffice.
As I have said, one aim of the study of cultural evolution is to provide
distribution explanations. These explanations account for how and why some
ideational variants [v1, v2, …, vn] at some distribution [d1, d2, …, dn] engender, at
some latter time-step, the distribution [d’1, d’2, …, d’n]. So given the following set
of ideational variants [a, b, c] with frequency distributions of [20, 50, and 30%] at
time t1, a distribution explanation would account for how and why this distribution
has changed at time t2 to [10, 30, 60%].
The complexities and contingencies involved in human culture frustrate a one-
size-fits-all approach to generating cultural evolutionary distribution explanations.
As a result, cultural evolutionary researchers have adopted a strategy of piecemeal
modelling, employing multiple idealised and abstracted models. Such models
typically examine the effect of a single causal factor on distributions of ideational
variants. The has produced a literature rich in models that examine the impact of
specific psychological, sociocultural, and demographic factors on distributions of
ideational variants over time (e.g. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; Boyd and
Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 2002). To take one example, Henrich (2001) has
argued that learning influenced by a conformist bias—here, a bias towards acquiring
an ideational variant at a disproportionately higher frequency than the prevalence of
that behaviour in the population—generates a recognisable ‘s-shaped’ sigmoidal
diffusion curve under a range of parameterisations.2 The overall aim of this
modelling strategy is to produce a set of such models that can be combined (albeit in
complex ways) to generate distribution explanations for complex, real-world
scenarios (Boyd and Richerson 1985).
One can identify two approaches to modelling distribution dynamics in the
cultural evolutionary literature. The first takes the process of acquiring ideational
variants to be preservative, where individuals acquire variants with fidelity from
some pre-existing template or model (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999; Sterelny 2006).
The second approach takes the process of acquisition to be a transformative, where
individuals reconstruct what is acquired during the acquisition process (Sperber
1996).3
2 Cf. Eriksson and Coultas (2009), Claidie`re and Whiten (2012), Lewens (2015), and Acerbi et al. (2016)
for some recent criticisms and extensions of Henrich’s notion of conformist bias.
3 It is important to note that what may be best captured as a preservative process at one grain of analysis
may not be so at a more fine-grained level (Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015). One of the more contentious
issues between cultural epidemiologists and their interlocutors (e.g. Sperber 1996, 2000; Henrich and
Boyd 2002; Henrich et al. 2008; Sperber and Claidie`re 2008) has been the extent to which learning is
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The ‘modern synthesis’ in evolutionary biology has tended to view biological
inheritance as, at root, preservative (Pigliucci and Mu¨ller 2010). According to
standard characterisations, the acquisition of variants is explained by pointing to a
template-copying procedure, one that creates copies of parental DNA that are
subsequently passed on to offspring. Nonetheless, the explanatory emphasis on
preservation is compatible with integral sources of change and disruption. Mutation
is just such an integral process that introduces new variation into a population by
changing the content of variants (phenotypes) in virtue of modifications to the
underlying vehicles of such variants (genome sequences). Yet while mutation is
integral to evolution, the modern synthesis has not taken it to represent an
interesting phenomenon. Instead, they have foregrounded the explanatory relevance
of preservative processes and selection, while concomitantly reducing the role of
mutation to a background rate of change, or error (cf. McShea and Brandon 2010).
As I see it, the crucial difference between transformative and preservative
approaches turns on how each conceives of transmission and change. The
preservative approach holds that changes in content are introduced when error or
noise in a copying process introduces new variation—whether for better or for
worse. The transformative approach, by contrast, holds that changes in content
occurs as individuals (re-)construct variants given the operation of some (re-
)constructing system. In virtue of the variable nature of such a system, the same
signal or stimuli may lead to radically different reconstructions.4 In biology this
kind of transformative approach is championed by proponents of dynamical systems
theory who argue that ontogeny (which here includes a variety of reliable
environmental features) forms a background system that flexibly interprets signals
and stimuli in the production of phenotypes (Griffiths and Gray 1994; Oyama 2000).
This distinction between preservative and transformative approaches offers an
illuminating perspective on the way in which cultural evolution has been conceived
and modelled by different researchers. CAT emphasises the explanatory role of the
transformative approach, where reconstructive processes during learning lead to
variation in the content of ideational variants (Sperber 1996). By contrast, other
approaches assume a preservative approach, where ideational variants are acquired
with fidelity (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich 2001, 2016). However, the
consensus today seems to be that both kind of approaches are necessary to a full
understanding of cultural evolution (e.g. Henrich and Boyd 2002; Henrich 2004;
Sperber and Claidie`re 2008; Morin 2015), and that theoretical differences between
the approaches may result from the spatiotemporal grain at which their respective
Footnote 3 continued
adequately characterised as preservative. The issue seems to hinge on an equivocation in the use of the
term ‘learning’, with the cultural epidemiologists focusing on fine-grained details of single learning
episodes, with researchers like Boyd, Henrich, and Richerson tending to abstract away from such detail
and to operationalise learning as the acquisition of a model’s variant (Henrich et al. 2008; Henrich 2016).
4 Of course, this is perfectly compatible with it being the case that certain variants are acquired and
manifested with a high degree of reliability from generation to generation. It is not necessary that
transformative approaches deny the reliable recurrence of traits over time. It is just that transformative
approaches would deny that reliable recurrence is best explained in terms of high-fidelity replication, or
copying.
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investigations tend to take place (Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015). Indeed, I think that
most cultural evolutionary researchers would agree with the statement of Sperber
and Claidie`re (2008) when they write that the acquisition of variants ‘‘always
involves a combination of preservative and constructive [that is, transformative]
processes.’’ (p. 287. Cf. Sterelny 2001; Henrich et al. 2008).5
Nonetheless, despite this consensus position, it is incorrect to collapse these two
approaches. On this point, distinguishing between transformative and preservative
approaches can help to explain the resistance that cultural epidemiologists have had
to the identification of their approach with what Peter Richerson, Robert Boyd and
Joseph Henrich call ‘direct biases’ (i.e. Boyd and Richerson 1985) or ‘content-
based’ biases (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Henrich et al. 2008). Such content-based
or direct biases are those that make individuals ‘‘more likely to learn or remember
some cultural variants based on their content. Content-based bias can result from
calculation of costs and benefits associated with alternative variants, or because the
structure of cognition makes some variants easier to learn or remember.’’ (Richerson
and Boyd 2005, p. 69) But this already assumes an underlying preservative
approach, with content-based biases acting as a selective process either during
memory consolidation or by means of direct comparison (Boyd and Richerson
1985). Such selective processes determine whether and to what extent one
ideational variant, acquired with fidelity, is retained over time. But as Sperber and
Claidie`re (2008) note, these biases do not involve the transformation of the
‘‘contents of cultural variants [instead] they affect only their frequency […] in the
end some variants are more often retained than others.’’ (p. 287).
In a similar manner, it is also wrong to identify the transformative approach with
guided variation (e.g. Mesoudi et al. 2013; Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015). According to
Boyd and Richerson’s original formulation, guided variation occurs when individ-
uals learn from a model, and then ‘‘modify their initial phenotype according to
[a] learning rule.’’ (p. 95. Cf. Boyd and Richerson 1984; p. 430; Henrich 2001). For
Mesoudi, this modification is whatever ‘‘[c]auses cultural evolution to shift toward
inferential prior knowledge.’’ (Mesoudi et al. 2013, p. 197)6 This does sound very
similar to a transformative approach, and Mesoudi assumes that ‘‘[g]uided variation
resembles what cognitive anthropologists have called ‘‘cultural attraction’’’’
(Mesoudi et al. 2013, p. 197).
However, this too should be resisted by cultural epidemiologists. This is for the
simple reason that guided variation assumes that initial learning can be characterised
in a preservative manner (the initial learning of a ‘phenotype’ from some cultural
model) that is only subsequently transformed. Furthermore, guided variation is
5 I have here distinguished between ‘approaches’ rather than ‘processes’ to suggest that whether or not
something is seen as involving copying and error, rather than background systems and reconstructions, is
sometimes a matter of the particular assumptions at work in specific cultural evolutionary models. But
this is consistent with there being a determinate matter of fact as to whether the processes involved are
best characterised as transformative or preservative.
6 It should be noted that Mesoudi et al.’s (2013) definition represents a shift from the initial articulation
of guided variation as given by Boyd and Richerson (1985). For Boyd and Richerson, the subsequent
modification of phenotypes in guided variation was taken to involve trial-and-error experimentation (p.
35. For an analogous articulation, cf. Henrich 2001, p. 996).
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construed in such a manner that this subsequent transformation is something that can
take place over extended periods of time, as individuals tinker, experiment, and change
their acquired variants (Boyd and Richerson 1985). But cultural epidemiologists have
been forceful in arguing that transformational processes are at work during the
acquisition process (Sperber 1996, 2000). So the transformative approach should not
be identified with content-biases, nor guided variation.
As a final comment, it is important to note that both transformative and
preservative approaches can conceptualise and characterise processes that lead to
systematic and directional changes in the distribution of variants in a population
(Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 2002; Claidie`re and Sperber 2007).
As in biological evolution, in cultural evolution high-fidelity processes can lead to
the differential growth of one type of variant over another. Yet the transformative
approach too can explain directional population-level effects. It can do so under the
assumption that individuals in a population transform the content of variants in
similar ways. Yet, while these two kinds of explanations may account for similar
kinds of directional effects, they are likely to appeal to very different kinds of
underlying causal processes and grains of analysis.
Cultural attractors and factors of attraction
As I have argued, cultural epidemiologists adopt a transformative approach to
studying culture (e.g. Sperber 1985, 1996). Practically, this means that CAT models
assume distributions of ideational variants are ‘‘largely determined by the
transformation of culture.’’ (Claidie`re and Andre´ 2011 p. 13) Central to this
transformative approach is the concept of cultural attractors. Cultural attractors are
part of an explanatory endeavour ‘‘[aimed] at explaining the relative prevalence and
stability of cultural contents.’’ (Claidie`re and Sperber 2007, p. 91) In other words,
cultural attractors are involved in providing distribution explanations. But what are
cultural attractors? As Dan Sperber writes:
[An] attractor, as I have characterized it, is an abstract, statistical construct, like a
mutation rate or a transformation probability. To say that there is an attractor is
just to say that, in a given space of possibilities, transformation probabilities
form a certain pattern: they tend to be biased so as to favour transformations in
the direction of some specific point, and therefore cluster at and around that
point. An attractor is not a material thing; it does not physically ‘attract’
anything. To say that there is an attractor is not to give a causal explanation; it is
to put in a certain light what is to be causally explained: namely, a distribution of
items and its evolution, and to suggest the kind of causal explanation to be
sought: namely, the identification of genuine causal factors that bias micro-
transformations.’’ (Sperber 1996, pp. 111–112, italics added)
It is crucial to note that there are a number of unresolved ambiguities in this
characterisation. Should attractors be understood as descriptions of individual
tendencies to transform variants in patterned ways? Or by contrast, should cultural
attractors be understood as ‘specific points’ in some abstract ‘variant-space’ around
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which variants tend to cluster? And what are these factors of attraction—the
underlying casual factors that generate transformation probabilities?
In what follows, I discuss the various, and sometimes contradictory, ways in
which cultural attractors and factors of attraction are employed in CAT. I first
identify four distinct ways in which the cultural attractor concept has been
characterised, and suggest that the tendencies they purport to capture need not lead
to concordant distributions. Second, I examine factors of attraction, identifying
three distinct kinds of factors. Here I suggest that some of these factors of attraction
may require further philosophical and theoretical attention.
Four characterisations of the cultural attractor concept
As Sperber argues in the quote above, cultural attractors are a statistical construct,
like a mutation rate or transformation probability. These he thinks, generate a
particular pattern. In turn, this pattern tends ‘‘to be biased so as to favour
transformations in the direction of some specific point, and therefore cluster at and
around that point.’’ (Sperber 1996, p. 112) But as I noted above, this characterisation
is ambiguous. Are cultural attractors a particular pattern—an aggregate of
transformation probabilities—or are attractors wherever variants happen to cluster?
It is important to note that these two conceptualisations need not coincide.
Patterns of transformation probabilities can be unevenly distributed across a variant
landscape, and such landscapes can have ‘high’ and ‘jagged’ peaks. Furthermore,
transformations can be ‘jumpy’: reconstruction can be such that one adopts a
radically different variant from one’s model. Indeed, one can imagine any number
of possible transformation patterns that are unlikely to generate clustering around a
particular variant. Sperber’s suggestions to the contrary, there is no straightforward
conceptual link between patterns of transformation and clustering of variants.
But these are not the only conceptualisations of cultural attractors. A distinct
characterisation is given in a recent paper by Claidie`re et al. (2014). Here,
‘‘processes […] may tend to transform different inputs in similar ways (rather than
randomly), and in doing so cause the outputs to tendentially converge upon
particular types, called attractors.’’ (p. 4, italics added) Here too there is an
ambiguity between understanding attractors as a tendency of individuals to
transform inputs in patterned ways, and as a tendency for variants to converge on a
particular type. Nonetheless, Claidie`re et al. (2014) define attractors as ‘‘any type
whose relative frequency tends to increase over time.’’ (p. 5)
Finally, consider an intriguing cultural feature central to CAT. Cultural
epidemiologists often talk about ‘macro-level stability’, the idea that ‘‘cultural
information is relatively stable within whole populations and often across
generations.’’ (Claidie`re and Sperber 2007, p. 91. Cf. Sperber 1996, 2000). Indeed,
Claidie`re and Sperber (2007) assert that attractors only change over ‘‘historical time,
that is, slowly enough to uphold the relative stability of culture.’’ (p. 92)7 This is
7 It should be noted that while some cultural attractors might change over ‘historical time’, it is not clear
why Claidie`re and Sperber (2007) commit themselves to the claim that cultural attractors change at such a
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allied with a position where ‘‘cultural contents owe much of their stability to the
directionality of constructive psychological processes.’’ (Sperber and Claidie`re
2008, p. 289). For CAT, the stability of culture is a key explanandum.
An intuitive way of capturing this stability is to wed it to the notion of equilibria
states. Cultural attractors might be identified with the distribution at which various
ideational variants come to settle. This seems to be how cultural attractors are in fact
identified by Claidie`re et al. (2014). Claidie`re et al. are concerned with articulating a
sparse modelling strategy they term evolutionary causal matrices. Without getting
too deep into the complexities of this modelling strategy, we can characterise these
matrices as simple recipes for determining how different types of ideational variants
change in absolute number (and, by extension, relative frequency) over time. In the
examples considered by Claidie`re et al., these matrices settle into a stable frequency
distributions—more specifically, stable global equilibria.
It should be noted that Claidie`re et al. (2014) never explicitly identify cultural
attractors with equilibria. However, it is clear from their arguments that it is only
when the relative frequency of variants enters into a stable equilibrium that one
can adjudicate whether or not there are attractors. Arguments from Acerbi and
Mesoudi (2015) suggest that this is how they too take Claidie`re et al. (2014).
Acerbi and Mesoudi argue that what they call the ‘extended’ interpretation of
attraction holds that ‘‘‘‘attraction’’ is synonymous with any directional change in
cultural evolution’’ (Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015, p. 488). Insofar as any
directional change (that is, change in the frequency of ideational variants) will
end up stabilising at global equilibria, this extended interpretation holds that
such equilibria points are cultural attractors (Acerbi, pers. comm.). Thus,
irrespective of whether or not Claidie`re et al. (2014) believe that cultural
attractors can be identified equilibria points, their remarks and modelling
approach suggest as much. I take it, then, that it is thus worthwhile to identify
and analyse this position, if only for subsequent use as a foil for cultural
epidemiologists to clarify their position.
So ‘cultural attractor’ is a statistical concept, picking out some tendency of a
population, which is in turn the result of a number of underlying factors (more on
this below). Here I have argued that cultural epidemiologists have missed
ambiguities in their characterisations of this tendency. Indeed, I suggest that we
can distinguish four distinct conceptualisations, or notions, of the cultural attractor
concept from the analyses above. These four notions are tendencies: (1) for
individuals to transform variants in patterned ways; (2) for variants to cluster around
a specific point; (3) for a variant (or variants) to increase in relative frequency, and;
(4) for variants to settle at some equilibrium point. From here on, I will refer to these
Footnote 7 continued
rate. This is an unusual claim, and one might think it is in conflict with the explanatory aims of CAT. If
cultural attractors are supposed to play a part in providing distribution explanations for human culture,
then the concept should be apt for explaining phenomena that are stable in the short term (fashions, fads,
etc.). Since not all cultural epidemiologists seem to hold on to this claim about the long-lived nature of
cultural attractors, Claidie`re and Sperber owe us an explanation for why cultural attractors, as they
understand them, only change over ‘historical time’.
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simple as TRANSFORMATION PATTERN, CLUSTER POINT, INCREASING
FREQUENCY, and EQUILIBRIUM POINT respectively.8,9
These different notions of the cultural attractor concept can be clearly
distinguished. Useful in this endeavour is Claidie`re and Sperber’s (2007) model
of smoking behaviour. This is a simple model that examines the frequency of
various behaviours in a population; here, how many cigarettes one smokes per day.
In Claidie`re and Sperber’s models, there are thirty-one possible smoking
behaviours: smoking zero cigarettes per day up to smoking thirty cigarettes per
day (the authors assume that individuals only smoke whole cigarettes). In this model
each time-step involves a new cohort of smokers replacing the old, but only after
individuals in this new cohort pick a model from the older generation to learn from.
This separates out the ‘sampling’ of models from the ‘learning’ from such models,
and allows Claidie`re and Sperber to evaluate the impact of both sampling biases
(biases that impact who individuals learn from, what the authors call cultural
selection) and the force of attraction (the impact of transformative processes during
learning) on variant distributions.
In all of Claidie`re and Sperber’s models, sampling biases cause individuals to
preferentially learn from individuals who smoke ten cigarettes a day. Following the
choice of a cultural model, individuals learn how many cigarettes to smoke. This
learning is transformative, with individuals reconstructing variants in a way
influenced by the force of attraction. This influence is represented by a mathematical
function, what the authors call the attraction curve, one whose strength peaks at five
and twenty-five cigarettes per day (Fig. 1). For Claidie`re and Sperber, higher
strength at distinct points of the attraction curve signals a greater ‘pull’ on
individuals to transform variants toward the attractor peaks. Thus, to say that the
strength of an attractor increases towards a peak means that the likelihood of
adopting the behaviour of smoking five cigarettes or twenty-five cigarettes increases
disproportionately as individuals learn from models close to these peak values.
It is straightforward to identify TRANSFORMATION PATTERN with the
mathematical description of the force of attraction captured by the attraction curve.
After all, this function describes the tendency of the population to reconstruct
variants in certain patterned ways. It describes, in other words, the aggregation of all
the transformation probabilities in a population, with variants that individuals are
more likely to reconstruct having higher ‘strength’. This identification is supported
by the scenario wherein the strength of sampling bias (the bias to disproportionately
8 Following standard convention, I shall refer to distinct notions by using capital letters. Thus, ‘the notion
of xyz’ is abbreviated to ‘XYZ’.
9 One may be tempted to argue that CLUSTER POINT and EQUILIBRIUM POINT are the actual
cultural attractors, while TRANSFORMATION PATTERN and INCREASING FREQUENCY are mere
tendencies toward such points (cf. Claidie`re et al. 2014, p. 4). Even if it makes sense in some cases to
speak of patterned trajectories toward determine points, both CLUSTER POINT and EQUILIBRIUM
POINT implicate distinct kinds of statistical tendencies – tendencies of populations to end up with certain
kinds of frequency distributions. As I show below, because of this fact, it seems likely that these
conceptualisations pick out very different kinds of tendencies from those involved in TRANSFORMA-
TION PATTERN and INCREASING FREQUENCY. If this is true, then it is not clear what is gained by
making the semantic gambit to distinguish ‘points’ and ‘patterns’, as one is still left with four distinct
tendencies to account for.
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select certain individuals as models) is set to zero, and as a result, individuals
randomly pick models to learn from. Under such parameters, the frequency
distribution of smoking behaviour comes to settle on values reflecting the attraction
curve, with the greatest frequency of behaviours clustered around the attraction
peaks at five and twenty-five (Claidie`re and Sperber 2007, pp. 94–95). As Claidie`re
and Sperber (2007) write: ‘‘If there was only attraction and no selection, we would
expect after some time the distribution of smoking patterns to correspond to the
attraction curve.’’ (p. 94) That is, the distribution would come to reflect the
aggregation of transformation probabilities.
Different parameterisations of Claidie`re and Sperber’s model, however, show
how TRANSFORMATION PATTERN can pull apart from the other notions,
notably, CLUSTER POINT and INCREASING FREQUENCY. To see why,
consider what happens when sampling biases are reintroduced (Claidie`re and
Sperber 2007, p. 108). When sampling biases are non-negligible, the distribution of
variants is skewed towards ten, away from the attractor peaks of zero and twenty-
five (Fig. 2). Indeed, by manipulating the strength of sampling biases, cultural
attractors, and the initial distribution of variants, one can change which variants will
have increased by the end of a model’s run—variants that might be far from the
attractor peaks as described by the attraction curve. When the strength of sampling
bias is the predominant factor, for instance, variants will come to cluster around ten
cigarettes (Fig. 3). It seems clear, then, that neither CLUSTER POINT nor
INCREASING FREQUENCY need coincide with TRANSFORMATION
PATTERN.
Fig. 1 The relative strength of the force of attraction and sampling biases (adapted from Claidie`re and
Sperber 2007)
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Fig. 2 The mean distribution of variants after ten model runs of 200 generations with both sampling bias
and the force of attraction. Note that variants do not cluster at (but do cluster near) the cultural attractor
peaks, while they do cluster at the sampling bias peak (adapted from Claidie`re and Sperber 2007)
Fig. 3 The mean distribution of smoking behaviour after ten model runs of 200 generations. Here
smoking behaviour is clustered around the sampling bias peak of ten cigarettes smoked per day (adapted
from Claidie`re and Sperber 2007)
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So when Claidie`re and Sperber de-idealise their model, adding back in sampling
biases, it demonstrates that at least three notions of the cultural attractor concept do
not coincide. But what about EQUILIBRIUM POINT? How does it line up with the
other notions?
Recall that EQUILIBRIUM POINT is associated with one of the central
motivating issues for CAT, that transformations explain the stability of culture over
time (Sperber 1996, 2000, 2001; Claidie`re and Andre´ 2011; Claidie`re et al. 2014;
Morin 2015). I have suggested that at least one plausible way of cashing this out is
in terms of stable equilibria into which variants settle. As such, EQUILIBRIUM
POINT is not something that can be captured by a single run of a model. It is
something that can only be identified by looking at a model under a range of
different parameterisations and by performing analyses to determine where and
under what parameters the variants of a model settle into a stable equilibrium state
(e.g. Creanza and Feldman 2014).
With this in place we can now note that the same TRANSFORMATION
PATTERN, that is, the same characterisation of how individuals transform variants,
can generate a range of equilibria. As Claidie`re and Sperber (2007, pp. 107–109)
show, by varying the relative strength of the force of attraction (the TRANSFOR-
MATION PATTERN) to sampling bias, one can generate stable equilibria with very
different distributions of variants.
The shifting of equilibria has implications for CLUSTER POINT and
INCREASING FREQUENCY as well: while some parameterisations may lead to
variants increasing in frequency or clustering when reaching the EQUILIBRIUM
POINT, the same variants in other parameterisations may decrease in frequency or
not involve clustering. EQUILIBRIUM POINT is not only distinct from
TRANSFORMATION PATTERN but from CLUSTER POINT and INCREASING
FREQUENCY as well.
The punchline of all these considerations is that the four statistical notions of the
cultural attractor concept are each identified with distinct kinds of population-level
tendencies. These tendencies may, in a variety of situations, generate distinct
frequency distributions.
At this point, we might reasonably wonder: why is it that these varied notions of
the cultural attractor concept have escaped the notice of cultural epidemiologists?
To my mind there are two plausible answers. The first implicates idealisation: when
forces other than attraction are negligible, the various notions of the attractor
concept may coincide. That is, variants can settle into a stable distribution
(EQUILIBRIUM POINT), where the variants that increase in relative frequency
(INCREASING FREQUENCY) cluster together (CLUSTER POINT) in virtue of
the shared, aggregate transformation probabilities of individuals (TRANSFORMA-
TION PATTERN). In such an idealised circumstance, all four underlying
tendencies may be concordant: they all lead to the same population-level outcome.
But when de-idealised—for instance, when sampling biases are reintroduced and
parameters are varied (as Claidie`re and Sperber do above)—these four tendencies
may generate discordant frequency distributions. The issue here is that cultural
epidemiologists may have predominantly theorised about cultural attractors in
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idealised circumstances, and this has hindered their ability to see the ambiguity in
the concept being used.
Related to this is a second possibility, most forcefully expressed by Alex
Mesoudi (2011). CAT lacks well-developed sets of formal models that opera-
tionalise the cultural attractor concept. The notable exceptions—Claidie`re and
Sperber (2007) and Claidie`re et al. (2014)—are not put forward by the cultural
epidemiologists as foundational models, but instead as instrumental tools to show
that the ‘pull’ of cultural attractors (the ‘force of attraction’) need not straightfor-
wardly combine with sampling biases (Claidie`re and Sperber), or that an abstract
characterisation of attractors might generate similar dynamics to those seen in
formal population genetics (Claidie`re et al.). So while it might sound as though CAT
is grounded in formal concepts derived from dynamic systems theory, in fact, terms
like ‘attraction’, ‘attractor’, and the like, are qualitative terms. Indeed, the
arguments and methods of CAT remain predominantly qualitative. For Mesoudi,
at least, the lack of work grounding these concepts in formal models may explain
why cultural epidemiologists have had problems noticing ambiguity.
Mesoudi’s point has bite, and I hope that the reflections here spur cultural
epidemiologists to produce further models, and to focus greater attention on how the
cultural attractor concept should be operationalised. Nonetheless, one can resist the
position implicit in some of Mesoudi’s assertions; that the only good work in
cultural evolution is quantitative. Though formal modelling can make explicit the
otherwise implicit assumptions of theories, one should be cautious in seeing all
qualitative work as vague and valueless. Despite his occasionally tough rhetoric, I
suspect Mesoudi (2011) would agree—both qualitative and quantitative work is
valuable, and progress is often made when the two enter into a vigorous dialectic.
Factors of attraction
The cultural attractor concept is statistical, picking out populational tendencies.
These tendencies in turn are the aggregate result of many lower-level processes.
These lower-level processes are what cultural epidemiologists call factors of
attraction. But what are these factors of attraction? Here too, I suggest, we find a
great deal of variation. In what follows, I distinguish three different sets of causal
factors that have been discussed in the literature: reconstructive learning,
motivational factors, and ecological factors. These sets may be invoked separately
or together as the underpinnings of a particular cultural attractor, but at least as I
construe these sets they are non-overlapping: psychological processes implicated in
reconstructive biases are not identical with those implicated by motivational factors
or ecological factors.
Let me begin by articulating the factors of attraction most often discussed by
cultural epidemiologists (Sperber 1985, 1996, 2000, 2001; Claidie`re and Sperber
2007; Claidie`re et al. 2014). According to Sperber (1996), an important set of causal
factors involves the ‘‘convergence of your affective and cognitive processes with
those of many people towards some psychologically attractive type of views in the
vast range of possible views.’’ (Sperber 1996, p. 106) Such ‘convergence’ also
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implicates one’s background knowledge (Sperber 1996). As Claidie`re and Sperber
(2007) write, when ‘‘an individual acquires a new cultural item (e.g. a skill, a belief,
or a norm), she never just copies the variant or variants she observes; rather,
drawing on the information transmitted and her own background knowledge,
inferential abilities, and interests, she constructs a variant of her own.’’ (p. 91) Let us
call this set of processes, those that involve doxastic, affective, axiological, and
cognitive influences on the inferences made during learning, reconstructive
learning.10
Factors salient to reconstructive learning will vary according to the relevant
contrast classes. As Sperber (1996) writes, such learning is ‘‘rooted in part in
universal human psychology and in part in the local cultural context.’’ (p. 108) If
this is the case, then all human individuals will to some extent share transformative
processes in virtue of their shared evolutionary history. These processes might
include those typically invoked by cultural epidemiologists, like ‘folk knowledge’,
‘folk biology’, ‘folk physics’, and, perhaps, agency detection (Sperber 1996; Atran
1998; Boyer 2001; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004, 2007). But these deep psycho-
logical structures are not always the most salient explanatory factors. Across
different human populations, individuals will be influenced by local norms and
mores, the beliefs that they acquire as part of being raised in a particular culture, as
well as more idiosyncratic differences rooted in personality and individual
experience. Different contrast classes will here demarcate the relevant kinds of
biases on the inferential processes occurring during learning.
Reconstructive learning is what Acerbi and Mesoudi (2015) call the ‘narrow
notion’ of cultural attractors, one where ‘‘cultural transmission is a mainly
reconstructive process’’ (p. 483) and involves ‘‘transformative, non-selective
processes in cultural transmission.’’ (p. 488). Indeed, reconstructive learning is
identified by Mesoudi (2011; Mesoudi and Whiten 2008; Mesoudi et al. 2013) with
the experimental methodology of ‘transmission chains’ (Hoppitt and Laland 2013).
These are experiments where agents (or groups of agents) transmit information
‘down the chain’ from one individual to the next, not unlike the children’s game
‘telephone.’ This experimental paradigm can reveal transformational tendencies.
For example, Kimmo Eriksson and Julie Coultas and the philosopher Shaun Nichols
provide evidence that something like ‘core disgust’—where a strong negative
affective reaction combining ‘‘(1) a sense of oral incorporation […]; (2) a sense of
offensiveness; and (3) contamination potency’’ (Rozin et al. 2000, p. 640)—has a
noticeable effect on the extent to which stories are modified and retained in memory
(Eriksson and Coultas 2014) and the moral norms that are likely to be preserved in
populations over time (Nichols 2002).
10 Cultural epidemiologists also discuss (though not to as great an extent) the way in which the
production of behaviour may also involve inferences (e.g. Sperber 1996; Morin 2015). I take it the idea is
that one needs to know not only how to produce a behaviour but when it is appropriate to do so.
Determining the when of behavioural expression might involve making inferences about the
appropriateness of behaviour, and these inferences can be biased in various ways. In what follows, I
use the label of reconstructive learning to capture these phenomena, together with the inferential biasing
involved in reconstructive learning.
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But while reconstructive learning and transmission-chain studies capture an
important aspect of CAT, cultural epidemiologists often invoke other sets of causal
factors besides reconstructive learning. These factors don’t fit neatly into Acerbi and
Mesoudi’s ‘narrow notion’. Consider here Olivier Morin’s (2015) notion of
motivational attraction. These are putative factors of attraction that ‘‘make us want
to use or transmit’’ (p. 148) a particular variant. Morin’s chosen example involves
coercion:
Legend has it that the Manchu haircut (a tight braid in the back behind a
shaved head) had been adopted because it freed the field of vision of steppe
raiders. Others say the braids could be used as a pillow to sleep on the rough.
[…] Either way, it was such a strong symbol for the Manchu Qing dynasty that
it decided, upon its accession, to make it mandatory for all the emperor’s
subjects, on pains [sic] of death.
Here it is more than reconstructive learning that explains the spread of the
Manchu haircut: it is the threat of death! The ‘Qing edict’ here is implicated as a
(particularly weighty) factor in individual risk/reward calculations, and the result of
such calculations explains the widespread adoption of the Manchu haircut. Morin’s
motivational attraction—or motivational factors of attraction—is thus identified
with a range of (potentially) deliberative strategies for adopting and spreading
certain variants.
Morin does not make a sharp conceptual distinction between reconstructive
learning and motivational factors, but here is one possible means of doing so:
motivational factors are implicated in biasing personal or sub-personal decisional
processes as to which behaviour (from a behavioural repertoire) one should express
in an appropriate situation. This characterisation makes clear that while motiva-
tional factors influence which behaviours one is motivated to produce, reconstruc-
tive learning influences what variant one will acquire during such learning, and
when such variants are appropriate to produce.
Finally, cultural epidemiologists do not just speak about psychological factors.
They also appeal to a wide variety of ecological factors of attraction (Sperber
1985, 1996, 2001; Claidie`re and Sperber 2007; Claidie`re et al. 2014; Acerbi and
Mesoudi 2015). Just as there are natural barriers (oceans, mountain ranges) that in
part determine the spread of diseases—so too, the thought goes, can ecological
factors impact the spread of ideational variants. To take one example, if there is no
clay in my local environment, I won’t be able to produce clay tablets for writing or
throw pots (Sperber and Claidie`re 2008).
That the environment can play a role in frustrating or facilitating the spread of
ideational variants is obvious. And if the term ‘factors of attraction’ picks out all the
causal processes that may be relevant to the spread of ideational variants, then it will
include such environmental and ecological causes. While this necessitates that
CAT’s theoretical apparatus encompasses a wide range of phenomena—including
extremely local and contingent events—I do not see this as much of an impediment.
After all, models in evolutionary theory capture heterogeneous processes by
grouping them into abstractly characterised processes such as drift or selection.
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Nonetheless, drift and selection are taken to capture different kinds of heteroge-
neous processes and their effects on populations. So toomight we think that ecological
factors of attraction might be organised and taxonomised into distinct kinds of causal
processes. There are scattered remarks throughout the CAT literature suggesting such
distinct kinds. Sperber (1996, p. 113) identifies local culture, ancestral selection
pressures, the material make-up of artefacts, and the ‘medium of transmission’ as
distinct kinds of ecological factors of attraction. Morin’s (2015) suggests that
accessibility to the public productions of culture is another. Finally, Heintz and
Claidie`re (2015, p. 804) suggest that access to resources (rather than access to public
expressions of ideational variants) and ‘‘multiple aspects of the natural environment’’
are involved in the production of culture.
Yet as these few remarks suggest, cultural epidemiologists have not focused their
energies on taxonomising and characterising ecological factors of attraction. Indeed,
much of the empirical and conceptual work in CAT is targeted at psychological
factors of attraction. This is unfortunate, not least because these ecological factors
of attraction seem to work at various spatiotemporal scales, and would seem to have
very different causal effects on the distribution and form of cultural variants.
Distinguishing, characterising, and organising various kinds of ecological factors of
attraction seems a pressing issue for future CAT work.
I suggested above that transformative approaches implicate a background system,
and that given the nature and state of such a background system, the same input may
be transformed into different outputs. We can here apply this claim to the cultural
realm and cash it out in more detail. Different factors of attraction determine the
make-up of the background system against which transformations of ideational
variants occur. I have here shown that there are at least three non-overlapping sets of
factors of attraction that cultural epidemiologists appeal to when characterising the
nature of this background system. I have also suggested that the theoretical role of
ecological factors of attraction within this picture may require further scrutiny by
cultural epidemiologists, insofar as the environment may play a variety of roles in
causing change in the distribution and form of culture over time.
Conclusion
CAT is a transformative approach to studying culture, one that should not be
collapsed into preservative ones. CAT gains empirical and explanatory purchase on
cultural phenomena by means of a number of idiosyncratic conceptual tools. I have
here argued that these conceptual tools require further attention and clarification. In
particular, I have shown that one can identify four distinct notions, or conceptu-
alisations of the cultural attractor concept. These four notions—TRANSFORMA-
TION PATTERN, CLUSTER POINT, EQUILIBRIUM POINT, and INCREASING
FREQUENCY—pick out different kinds of populational tendencies. While in some
cases these tendencies may lead to similar or identical variant distributions, this is
likely only to occur in idealised scenarios. However, when de-idealised, for instance
with the addition of sampling biases, these four notions may not coincide.
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Along the same lines, I have shown that cultural epidemiologists appeal to a
range of ‘factors of attraction’. Here I argued that these factors are not adequately
captured by existing taxonomies, and pointed to areas where further conceptual
work is required.
Indeed, there are a range of outstanding issues yet to be addressed in CAT.
Should motivational attractors be identified with processes governing the selection
of behaviours from a repertoire? How might ecological factors of attraction be
taxonomised? Are there reasons to privilege some kinds of factors over others? I
leave these questions for further analyses.
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